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1. Introduction
Proper names have been undoubtedly one of the most discussed topics in  
philosophy of language; whether this is deservedly so is not among my present  
concerns. The motivations that are driving my paper are not so much proper names  
per se, as the issue of how they fit into a more general framework of meaning,  
reference and content that I have been trying to develop in recent years (e.g. in  
Stojanovic 2005, Stojanovic 2008). So far, my main focus has been on indexicals,  
which are often thought of, following Kaplan (1977)'s influential work, as directly  
referential expressions par excellence; that is, expressions that contribute their 
reference, and nothing but their reference, to semantic content. Against the  
mainstream view, I have held that all there is to semantic content is the lexically  
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encoded content; in particular, I have argued that the things and individuals referred to  
with the help of indexical pronouns, while being relevant to determining truth value,  
are neither part of semantic content nor otherwise involved in determining semantic  
content (cf. Stojanovic 2009). In section 2, I will briefly survey some motivations for  
this view, and explain how I see the interplay between reference, meaning and content  
in the case of indexicality. It should be noted that while it is central to my proposal  
that (indexical and demonstrative) reference does not reach into semantic content, I  
have no qualms with the sheer idea that reference can be part of content – or, alluding  
to the famous exchange between Frege and Russell, that Mont Blanc, with all its  
snowfields, may be a constituent of a proposition. But this leaves me with something  
of a dilemma: when it comes to names, which, too, are often thought of as directly  
referential expressions par excellence, are there reasons to depart from the 
mainstream Kripkean-Kaplanian view? 
Following the one horn of the dilemma, we might say that, unlike indexicals,  
names are indeed directly referential and contribute their reference, and nothing but  
their reference, to semantic content. Following the other horn of the dilemma, we  
might say that, as with indexicals, the things and individuals referred to with the help  
of names are neither part of semantic content nor otherwise involved in determining  
semantic content. The latter horn of the dilemma gives rise to further ramifications,  
depending on how we think of meaning – and, more precisely, of the lexically  
encoded meaning – in the case of proper names. The various options related to the  
question of whether names have meanings and, if they do, what their meanings  are  
like, will be explored in section 3, as well as the question of what kind of (logical)  
inferences proper names give rise to. The discussion of those two questions will pave  
Referring with proper names 2 I. Stojanovic
the way to distinguishing, in sections 4 and 5, three views that are all compatible with  
the idea that (indexical) reference does not reach into content: 
(1) the mainstream Kripkean-Kaplanian referentialist view of names; 
(2) the perhaps equally mainstream descriptivist view of names, which further  
bifurcates  into, on the one hand, the classical Fregean-Russellian view, on which  
some non-trivial description may be associated with a given name (e.g. “the teacher of  
Alexander the Great” for the name 'Aristotle'); and, on the other, the so-called  
metalinguistic view, on which, for any name N, the associated description is “the  
bearer of N”; 
(3) the off-stream view, which I have dubbed the pragmatic view, on which names 
contribute neither reference nor any kind of meaning to any semantic level – rather,  
names are merely pragmatic devices that help the hearer figure our what the speaker is  
talking about, and may therefore be relevant to determining truth value, but have no  
impact on semantics. 
The goal of my paper, then, is to clarify these views, and explain how each of them  
can fit into the more general picture outlined in section 2. Although I will not try to  
come up with any decisive argument for or against any of those views, I have great  
sympathy for the pragmatic view, hence my secondary goal in this paper will be to  
show it to be a very plausible view, notwithstanding appearances.  
2. Removing (demonstrative) reference from semantic content
In previous work, I have argued that all there is to semantic  content is the lexically 
encoded content, hence that the things referred to with the help of demonstrative and  
indexical pronouns, not being themselves part of the pronoun's lexical meaning, are  
Referring with proper names 3 I. Stojanovic
not part of the semantic content associated with the sentence in which the pronoun  
occurs. This does not mean, though, that the things referred to are not relevant to  
determining truth value. Thinking of it somewhat formally, semantic content may be  
represented by a function from a sequence of parameters that, along with possible  
world and time parameters, include parameters of individuals, into truth values. To 
illustrate the idea, suppose that I say, pointing at Tareq:
(1) He is a doctor.
My proposal, on a first approximation, is that the semantic content of (1) is a  
function from sequences (world, time, individual, p4 ... pn) to truth values, a function 
that returns value True if and only if i is a doctor in w at t (leaving the remaining 
parameters p4 ... pn unspecified, as they have no impact on the truth value in the case  
of (1)). So, with a sentence like (1), the semantic content will yield a truth value only  
once it has been given a world, a time, and an individual to be evaluated at. And 
normally, our judgments of truth concerning (1) will rely on evaluating the semantic  
content associated with (1) at Tareq, since he is the person about whom I am talking,  
as well as at the time at which (1) is uttered and at the world that we are in. The  
crucial point is that Tareq is no more part of the semantic content of (1) than are the  
world and the time of evaluation.
As already emphasized, removing reference from semantic content does not mean  
removing it altogether from the entire picture. To the contrary, reference still plays an  
important role in the account that I am proposing. I take it that communication  
presupposes that we should be able to convey information about people and things 
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around us, and that this, in turn, strongly suggests that we should be able to refer to 
those things directly. Here is an example of what I take to be a paradigmatic case of  
direct reference. Suppose that we have just tasted together a certain dish, and I simply  
say:
(2) Delicious!
I will be referring to that very dish, and will be saying of that dish that it is 
delicious. Or, to take another example, suppose that I say:
(3) I'm ready!
To determine the truth value of (3), one must determine who spoke, and what the  
world is like, viz. whether that person is ready, but of course, one must also determine  
which action or event (3) is about; e.g. if I am ready for lunch, but not ready to send  
off a job application, it is crucial to know whether it is the lunch or the job application  
that I am talking about in (3). And this, I take it, is something to which I would be  
referring directly.     
Examples (2) and (3) illustrate a form of reference that makes it possible to talk  
about a particular thing or event without having to use any expression for it, reference  
that relies entirely on the non-linguistic contextual setting in which communication  
takes place. It is this form of reference that I take to be direct reference par 
excellence. Reference supported by words like pronouns is merely parasitic on this  
other, more basic form of reference.          
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It is easy to confuse direct reference with the use of indexicals. A possible  
explanation of why indexicals are so often taken to be devices of direct reference is  
that in theorizing about them, philosophers often focus on those uses on which  
indexicals do no interesting semantic or pragmatic work – rather, they merely  
“articulate” the reference. Suppose that the following are uttered in the same  
situations in which (2) and (3) were uttered: 
(4) This is delicious!
(5) I'm ready for it.
These appear to be equivalent ways of expressing the same thing as in (2) and (3). 1 
However, the conclusion that one might be tempted to draw, to the effect that 'this' in  
(4) and 'it' in (5) must be contributing their reference to semantic content (for what  
else could they possibly contribute?), is clearly unwarranted. Rather than think of  
direct reference as a by-product of direct-referentiality, which would be a semantic 
property of a certain class of expressions, I propose that we view direct reference as,  
first and foremost, referring directly, which is an action performed by the speaker, and 
is, therefore, a pragmatic phenomenon. It does not require the speaker to use any  
expression that would stand for the thing referred to, and when it is  accompanied by 
the use of an indexical, the speaker will typically use the indexical in order to help her  
audience figure out what it is to which she, qua speaker, is referring. The idea is that  
the way in which indexicals help figuring out what is being referred to, is by 
1 Note, however, that (5) sounds rather odd in situations in which the bare “I'm ready” is fine; that is,  
situations in which there is no linguistic antecedent for the pronoun 'it' and no event contrasted with the  
one for which I say that we'll be late. On the other hand, the use of 'this' in (4) comes more naturally,  
since it is justified from the standpoint of syntax alone.   
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constraining the range of potential referents by means of constraints lexically encoded  
in their meaning. To illustrate the idea, suppose that we are looking at a certain 
couple, Tareq and Aysha, and I tell you:
(6) He is a doctor.
The 3rd person pronoun 'he' has only a very poor lexical meaning. All that is  
lexically encoded is that the person referred to should be male. But even this 
information, rather uninteresting in itself, is doing something useful in  
communication. It helps you, qua hearer, figure out that it is Tareq rather than Aysha 
that I am referring to, since he is the one who, among the things or people to whom I  
might be referring in the situation at stake, satisfies most saliently the condition  
associated with the pronoun 'he'.
What I hope to have done is to give you some idea about the interplay between  
reference and the use of indexicals, so let me now turn to the notion of semantic  
content to see where and how it fits into the picture. Recall the case in which, in  
reference to the dish we've just tasted , I simply say "delicious." The suggestion is that  
the semantic content in this case is simply a property; namely, deliciousness. 2 The 
object to which that property is attributed, that very dish, is not part of semantic  
content. Rather, it is that with respect to which semantic content will be normally  
evaluated for a truth value, just as it will be evaluated for a truth value at a certain  
2 Let us, for the sake of simplicity, pretend that deliciousness is indeed a property, i.e. a one-place  
predicate that applies to the object said to be delicious and does not require any other argument.  
Beware, though, that this simplification obliterates the fact that what is delicious to me need not be  
delicious to you. In other words, it would be more accurate to consider deliciousness as a relational  
property: something can be delicious with respect to some agents without being so with respect to  
others. For discussion, see Stojanovic (2007).   
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time and with respect to a certain state of affairs (or a possible world). 
On a first approximation, the same story might go for the case in which, in  
reference to Tareq, I say: 
(7) He is a doctor.
The semantic content associated with (7) would then correspond to a function that  
takes an individual, a time, a world, and perhaps other elements, and returns True if  
that individual is a doctor at that time and in that world, and False otherwise. 
Ultimately, I would like to defend this proposal. But a question immediately arises:  
what is going to be the difference between the semantic content associated with (7)  
and that associated with:
(8) She is a doctor.
The simple story, which, for reasons that will become clear shortly, I call the  
"exclusive" view, gives a simple answer: there is no difference! 
This answer will probably be met with some reluctance. More likely, one could  
think that, assuming that indexicals do not contribute reference to semantic content,  
they must contribute something else, hence presumably the constraints lexically  
encoded in their meaning. I call this the "inclusive" view, since it holds that the  
semantic content associated with a sentence that contains an indexical includes the 
constraints encoded in the indexical's lexical meaning, while the exclusive view holds  
that it doesn't. But how is one to run the inclusive view? On a first approximation, one  
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might suggest that the semantic content associated with (7) corresponds to a function  
that takes an individual, a time, a world, etc. and returns True if that individual is a  
doctor and male at that time and in that world, and False otherwise.  
This straightforward proposal will not work, though, for (at least) two reasons. The  
first one has to do with the interaction between indexicals and intensional operators  
(such as the various modal, temporal and epistemic expressions), viz. the fact that if  
one embeds (7) under, say, the possibility operator, what one is concerned with is  
whether there is a possible state of affairs in which Tareq is a doctor, whether or not  
Tareq is also male (i.e. satisfies the descriptive material lexically encoded in 'he') in  
that state. The problem can be solved by using the mechanism of double indexing, that 
is, by taking semantic contents to be function that take as arguments not just one time  
and one world, but rather, at a pair of times and a pair of worlds, the first of which are  
the "designated" time and world (the now and the actuality), the second of which are  
the time and the world deployed in the recursive truth clauses of non-indexical  
temporal and modal operators. 
The second reason why the straightforward proposal won't work is that if we  
evaluate the semantic content associated with (7) at, for example, Aysha, it will return  
False (since Aysha isn't a he). But then, assuming the usual truth clause for negation,  
the following will be true when evaluated at Aysha: 
(9) It's not the case that he is a doctor. 
Yet if I utter (9) in reference to Aysha, whom let us furthermore suppose to be a  
doctor, I will not be speaking truth. To solve this problem, one had better take the  
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semantic content associated with (7) to be a partial function, namely, a function that 
takes an individual i, a pair of times (t*, t) and a pair of worlds (w*, w), and returns 
True if i is male at t* and w* and i is a doctor at t and w, returns False if i is male at t*  
and w* and i is not a doctor at t and w, and simply does not return anything (i.e. is 
undefined) if i fails to be male at t* and w*.3 
Turning to the exclusive view, it holds that the semantic content of (7) just is the  
property of being a doctor, i.e. a total function that takes an individual, a time and a  
world (or sequences thereof), and returns True if the individual at stake is a doctor at  
the time and in the world of evaluation, and False otherwise. In other words, on this  
view, indexical and demonstrative pronouns do not contribute anything to semantic  
content. The semantic content of (7), if evaluated at Aysha, would thus return True if  
Aysha is a doctor, even though she is female. The lexical meaning of 'he' in (7) would,  
then, intervene at a post-semantic stage, at which semantic content gets evaluated for  
a truth value. Its role would be to indicate that only individuals who satisfy the  
lexically encoded constraint (i.e. who are male) may be plausibly taken as values for  
the parameters at which the content of (7) is to receive its truth value. By way of an  
analogy, suppose that I utter the sentence in (7) in a situation in which, as he have  
been talking about Khaled, Tareq comes in. To determine whether what I say is true,  
you need to evaluate the semantic content associated with (7) at an individual, and  
you have narrowed down your choices to Khaled and Tareq, but you still don't know  
which one to give preference to – for you don't know whether I'm talking about Tareq  
or Khaled. Now suppose that, as I say (7), I also make a pointing gesture towards  
3 This move will be familiar from formal theories of presupposition. Indeed, I believe that the most  
attractive variant of the inclusive view is that which construes the constraints lexically encoded in the  
meaning of pronouns as presuppositions (albeit of a special sort).  
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Tareq. Then this gesture serves as a device to indicate that it is Tareq, rather than  
Khaled, at which I want you to evaluate this content for its truth value. So then, just as  
such pointing gestures intervene at a post-semantic stage, to indicate at whom one  
could plausibly evaluate content for a truth value, so do the constraints lexically  
encoded in indexicals, according to the exclusive view. 4 
For the purposes of the present paper, we need not choose between the two views. 5 
What is important is to have the disctinction clearly laid out, as it will be relevant in  
the case of proper names, too, to which I turn now. 
3. How names fit into the lexicon and into logic
Before I set out to explain the various ways in which proper names may be  
incorporated into the general picture outlined in the previous section, I want to look at  
the data to be accounted for, and will start precisely with the question of whether it  
makes any sense to talk of lexical knowledge when it comes to proper names. The  
plausibility, for instance, of the descriptivist and, in particular, the metalinguistic view,  
is going to turn upon one's answer to this question. 
At a first glance, one might think that it is just obvious that names lack lexical  
4 Regardless of whether one goes inclusive or exclusive in the case of indexicals, there are aspects of 
lexical meaning that do not reach into semantic content. To take a fairly uncontroversial example,  
consider the Spanish pronouns 'tu' vs. 'Usted'. It is part of the lexical meaning of the latter that ones  
uses it to formally address one's interlocutor. But this lexical difference does not get reflected in  
semantics: from the point of view of semantics, 'tu' and 'Usted' are interchangeable. The difference may  
play a useful role in communication: consider a speaker who has two interlocutors, only one of whom  
he addresses formally; whether he uses the formal or the informal pronoun, he will express the same  
content; yet the choice of pronoun will help decide at whom to evaluate this content for a truth value.   
5 On a personal note, I used to defend the inclusive view (Stojanovic 2008), but am now more attracted  
to the exclusive view. I first used the terminology 'inclusive' vs. 'exclusive' in Stojanovic (2009), where  
I viewed both views as being "equally plausible".  
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meaning. For instance, the mere fact that one does not find in any dictionary an entry  
such as 'Tareq' suggests that this is not a word endowed with any lexical meaning –  
for, after all, that is precisely what dictionaries are there for, to tell us what the words  
of a given language mean. But, even if the right answer to our question may well be  
that proper names have no lexical meaning at all, the answer is not as obvious as one  
might have thought. It has been suggested by several philosophers (e.g. J. Katz) that  
there is a notion of lexical meaning that you may plausibly associate with proper  
names. The idea, as I see it, is that the mere fact that some string of symbols or sounds  
is a name endows this name with the meaning that can be approximated with the  
description “whoever bears this name”. So, the lexical meaning of any name N would  
be obtained by means of the following schema:
The Metalinguistic Thesis: 
The lexical meaning of N is “the bearer of N”. 
In the next section, some refinements to the thesis will be made, but for the time  
being, what matters is that one can plausibly hold that proper names do have lexical 
meanings, albeit all generated using a single schema. 
There is yet another way of answering the question whether names have meanings, 
namely, that some names do, and some don't. For example, 'Tareq' and other 
“ordinary” proper names don't, but there are names such that a person who ignores  
their meaning would not really count as a competent speaker of English. For example,  
the names of the twelve months in the calendar ('January', etc.), the names of the days  
in the week ('Sunday', etc.), names such as 'Earth', 'Sun', 'Moon', the names of the nine  
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planets, the names of the continents ('Africa', 'Asia'...), and so on. All these names are  
excellent candidates for being names knowledge of whose meaning is constitutive of  
the knowledge of English. These are proper names, yet a person who does not master  
them may be plausibly charged of not being a fully competent English speaker. Note  
also that names like these do get translated from one language to another, just as  
common nouns do, while a person's name such as 'Tareq Al-Mahoud' might perhaps  
be spelled diffently in different languages, but it is not subject to translation. 
The proposal here shares something with the classical descriptivist view, in that in  
holds that names (that is, those that are meaningful) may be associated with a non-
trivial lexically encoded material, rather than just the quasi-trivial constraint of being  
the bearer of a given name. But it is also significantly different from the descriptivist  
view, on the one hand because it holds that the associated lexical meaning does not  
vary from individual to individual, and on the other, because it does not generalize to  
all proper names. But one problem with the proposal is, precisely, the question of  
where to draw the line. For instance, you might think that 'France' is a name that has a  
lexical meaning, and that speakers are not fully competent in English if they lack the  
knowledge that France is a country, that the adjective derived from 'France' is 'French',  
etc. But, by parity of reasoning, the name of any country should then be part of the  
English lexicon. Yet, if someone has never heard, say, of Oman, and does not know  
that the derivative adjective is 'Omani', you may find this person uneducated, but it 
does not seem right to charge such a person with being an incompetent speaker of 
English! This is a problem, but I do not think that this is a major problem for this  
proposal: all it needs is to acknowledge that the borderline between names that do  
have lexical meanings and those that don't is vague (or at least underdetermined).  
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Let me now turn to a different, though not unrelated, question, namely: what kind  
of logical inferences are licensed by proper names? Consider an utterance of the  
following sentence: 
(10) Sophie is a mathematician.
What can one logically infer from (10) – that is, what can one infer from (10)  
merely in virtue of what the words in (10) mean and of how they are combined? For  
instance, here is a fairly uncontroversial case of something that logically follows from  
(10):  
(11) Someone is a mathematician.
And here is a fairly uncontroversial case of something that does not logically  
follow from (11), even if we grant that (11) cannot be a true utterance unless the  
following is also true:  
(12) The speaker of (10) can speak some English.  
But between the two, there are cases in which the answer is not as clear as for (11)  
or (12). For instance, one may wonder whether the following can be inferred from  
(10) merely in virtue of what the words in (10) mean:
 
(13) Someone is called 'Sophie'.
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If the answer is 'yes', then that provides a good reason to go with the metalinguistic  
view, and if the answer is 'no', that provides a good reason for rejecting it. I do not  
know the right answer to the question whether (13) logically follows from (10) – if  
there is a right answer, to begin with. What I know is that individual constants in First  
Order Logic (FOL), with which one often “translates” proper names, do not support  
the inference from (10) to (13). Furthermore, if you accept the metalinguistic thesis,  
and if you accept that logical inference is inference in virtue of what the words mean,  
then you should accept the following as a logical consequence of (10):
(14) There are two individuals, Sophie and the name 'Sophie', and the former is a  
bearer of the latter. 
But, of course, in FOL, a sentence of the form 'F(c)' (where F is a one-place  
predicate and c an individual constant), does not entail '∃x∃y(x≠y)'.6 
4. Compatibility with referentialist and descriptivist approaches
As I announced from the outset, my goal in this paper is not to defend any  
particular view of proper names, but rather, to show that several existing views are  
compatible with the more general picture of semantic content that I have developed  
elsewhere and simply outlined here. 7 I will also put forward an original – or, at least,  
6 ∃x∃y(x≠y) follows from (13) on the uncontroversially true assumption that a person's name is  
distinct from the person so-named. The argument and, more generally, the issue of logical inferences  
licensed by proper names, is discussed at greater length e.g. in Predelli (2009).
7 A view of semantic content similar to m ine (at least in certain respects) has been recently defended  
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less familiar – view, a view that probably fits best into the general picture, but is also  
too extreme for me to be able to properly argue for it within the span of this paper. 
Among the existing views, let me start with the mainstream referentialist view,  
inspired by Kripke and pursued by Donnellan, Kaplan, Salmon, and many others, with  
which I assume that the reader will be already familiar. I want to show that it is  
coherent to endorse a referentialist approach to proper names while giving it up in the  
case of indexicals. 
The easiest way to see that the two views, i.e. the referentialist view of names and  
the non-referentialist view of indexicals that I am proposing, are compatible is by  
looking at their formal aspects. Recall the truth clause that I have sketched for a  
pronoun like 'he' on the inclusive view, stated more explicitly below:
[['He is F']] (i, w, w*, t, t*) = 
- True if i∈///[['F']] (w, t) and i∈///[['male']] (w*, t*)
- False if i∉///[['F']] (w, t) and i∈///[['male']] (w*, t*)
- undefined otherwise
This clause can be straightforwardly incorporated into frameworks that use  
individual constants, whose interpretation is fixed directly by the interpretation  
function: the interpretation of an individual constant is a mapping from world-time  
pairs to individuals; presumably, a constant mapping (i.e., it assigns the same 
individual to every world-time pairs), which makes the constant a rigid designator.  
Suppose that you decide to represent a name such as 'Tareq' by such a rigid individual  
constant – which is tantamount to endorsing the referentialist view for proper names.  
e.g. in Carston (2008). See also the discussion in Lewis (1980).
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That is perfectly compatible with accepting the above truth-clause for the pronoun  
'he'. As for the exclusive view, the compatibility is completely straightforward.
Now, if you ask me whether I would opt for the referentialist view, I probably  
would not. Many among the considerations that lend plausibility to my approach to 
indexicals are at odds with the spirit of the referentialist view of semantic content,  
even when this one is restricted to proper names. Recall thus that one of my driving  
motivations was that when I say “He is a doctor” to communicate to you that Tareq is  
a doctor, I am referring directly to Tareq and saying of him that he is a doctor, and the 
condition of being male, lexically encoded in 'he', merely helps you figure out that it  
is Tareq that I am talking about. Now suppose that, in the same scenario, there are  
several men around, so the gender constraint is not at all helpful. But if I know that  
you know that Tareq's name is 'Tareq', then I could just tell you “Tareq is a doctor”. It  
would be nice to explain what happens here along more or less the same lines as in  
the case of what happened when I used the indexical 'he'. We might want to say that  
here, too, I was directly referring to Tareq, and that my use of his name was merely  
heuristic, to help my interlocutors realize that I was talking about him. 
Let me know turn to the descriptivist approaches, which hold that proper names are  
lexically meaningful. What I have called “classical” descriptivism will associate, with  
any given name N, some general, descriptive and, in general, informative constraints,  
such as “the teacher of Alexander the Great” with the name 'Aristotle', or “the capital  
of France” with the name 'Paris', and so on. On the other hand, the metalinguistic  
view will systematically associate a certain descriptive constraint with any give name  
N, namely, the constraint of being a bearer of N, using a single schema, or rule, that  
captures, once and for all, the lexical knowledge possessed by any speaker who is  
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deemed competent with proper names qua lexical category. I take it to be unnecessary 
to spell out either classical or metalinguistic descriptivism. 8 Rather, let me show that, 
when properly construed, either version of descriptivism – or, for that matter, a mixed  
view that combines both – is compatible with my account of semantic content.
Let DN stand for the descriptive constraint that the descriptivist view under  
consideration lexically associates with a given name N (in the metalinguistic view,  
that will simply be the constraint of either being a bearer of or being otherwise  
appropriately related to the name N). As in the case of indexical pronouns, the  
constraints lexically encoded in the meaning of the name would primarily play a  
heuristic role in that they would help the hearer figure out what the speaker is talking  
about, rather than being part of what the speaker is actually asserting. Recall our  
distinction from section 2 between the inclusive vs. the exclusive view regarding the  
semantic contribution of indexicals. The same sort of distinction may be drawn in the  
case of proper names. Thus, on the assumption that DN captures the lexical meaning 
of N, one has the choice between taking DN to be part of the semantic content 
associated with a sentence that contains N, or taking it to be something that, while  
playing a role in communication, only intervenes at a post-semantic stage to basically  
help the hearer decide with respect to what to evaluate the semantic content associated  
8 Classical descriptivism originates with classics such as Frege and Russell, but for a more systematic  
picture of how the view works, or might work, it may be more fruitful to look at Kripke (1980) – who,  
to be sure, criticizes the view, but by doing so explores various options that are available to it . For a 
more recent defense of this sort of descriptivism, see e.g. Stanely (1997). Metalinguistic descriptivism,  
defended e.g. in Bach (1987) or Katz (1994), still has a fair amount of partisans; for some more recent  
discussions, see e.g. Geurts (1997) or Bach (2002). While all of these might be considered relatively  
strong versions of descriptivism, I also take it that “referentialist” proposals such as in Recanati (1993)  
endorse, at the same time, a version metalinguistic descriptivism, as will become clear shortly. 
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with the sentence at stake. Leaving the discussion of the exclusive view for the next  
section, let us take a look at the inclusive view. Consider:
 
(15) It is possible that Tareq should not be a bearer of the name 'Tareq'.
(16) It is possible that Paris should not be the capital of France.
In order to account for the truth of (15) and (16), and, more generally, for the  
behavior of names embedded under intensional operators (as well as under negation),  
the inclusive view will distinguish the way in which a proper name contributes to  
semantic content from the way in which a predicate in the verb phrase does. The same  
move as in the case of indexicals immediately suggests itself: 
[['N is F']] (i, w, w*, t, t*) = 
- True if i∈///[['F']] (w, t) and i∈///[['DN']] (w*, t*)
- False if i∉///[['F']] (w, t) and i∈///[['DN']] (w*, t*)
- undefined otherwise
As repeatedly emphasized, my aim is not to defend any particular view of names.  
The problems that the descriptivist views encounter are well-known, although the  
views outlined in this section are able to succesfully deal with many among those  
problems. In particular, the so-called Modal Argument does not affect views whose  
semantics proceeds along the same lines as the truth clause suggested above.
Now, if you ask me whether I would opt for either version of the descriptivist view,  
I probably would not. Consider first classical descriptivism. One of its advantages is  
Referring with proper names 19 I. Stojanovic
that it can handle Frege's puzzle and explain how it can be informative to tell someone  
that Hesperus is Phosphorus, that Superman is Clark Kent, that Louise Ciccone is  
Madonna, that Gordon Sumner is Sting, etc. But when it comes to ordinary proper  
names, the view is only plausible (to my sense, at least) if the associated description is  
determined at the level of a single individual (or his or her idiolect) rather than at the  
level of a shared dialect, let alone a language like English. But then, if different  
individuals associate different descriptions (or clusters thereof), it becomes very  
implausible to view such descriptive constraints as being lexically encoded. In other 
words, while I think that this version of descriptivism could reach a fair amount of  
plausibility when taken as a theory of cognitive content, I do not think that it can give 
us a good theory of semantic content, and am unclear as to what the resulting theory  
of communicated content would look like. A descriptivist theory of semantic content  
should, it seems to be, be able to associate, with any proper name, some descriptive  
constraint that may be plausibly viewed as part of, or derived from, the lexicon  
(including perhaps some encyclopedic knowledge shared by the competent speakers  
of the language at stake). As suggested in section 3, there may be words of a language  
that, from a morpho-syntactic point of view, are proper names, yet have a lexically  
encoded meaning that is descriptive in a non-trivial, informative way. Thus a name  
like 'Earth' comes arguably closer to a common noun like 'planet' than to a name like  
'Tareq' or 'Sophie'; and similarly for the names of other planets or stars, of continents  
or oceans, etc. But if we leave those aside, then a descriptivist semantic view of those 
other, "ordinary" proper names, had better be the metalinguistic view.          
Does that mean, then, that I would go for the metalinguistic view? Not necessarily.  
For one thing, my preference for the exclusive view in the case of indexicals leads me  
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to prefer the exclusive view in the case of names as well; hence even if some lexically  
encoded content should be associated with a proper name, I would want to view it as  
playing a heuristic role when it comes to evaluating semantic content for a truth value,  
rather than as properly contributing to semantic content. More importantly, I think that  
the plausibility of the metalinguistic view hinges to a large extent on what inferences  
we want to come out logically valid, i.e. valid in virtue of the syntax and semantics  
alone of their premises and conclusion. Recall the following inferences from sect. 3:  
    
(17) Sophie is a mathematician. Therefore, someone bears the name 'Sophie'.
(18) Sophie is a mathematician. Therefore, there are (at least) two individuals who  
stand in the bearing-of relation.
I would be reluctant to view these as logically valid inferences. To the extent that  
they might still sound good, I would account for this at the level of pragmatics, just as  
I would do so for the fact that on the basis of observing that a Spanish speaker has  
used the formal pronoun 'Usted', one can correctly infer that the speaker has addressed  
her interlocutor formally. If we accept that these are pragmatic inferences, rather than  
logical inferences whose truth is warranted by semantics, we are drifting even further  
away from the metalinguistic (inclusive) view of proper names.
5. The pragmatic view
The pragmatic view is the view that proper names do not contribute anything to  
semantic content – rather, they are merely pragmatic devices, like pointing gestures,  
that help the hearer figure out to whom the speaker is referring. It may look as a fairly  
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radical view, but if one thinks of direct reference along the lines that I have sketched  
in the beginning of the paper, namely, as, first and foremost, the act of referring  
directly, done by a speaker in course of a conversational exchange, and if,  
furthermore, one is attracted by a Millian conception of proper names, on which they  
are like tags for objects and people, then one has every reason to find the pragmatic  
view very plausible. 
There are, however, two ways of arriving at the pragmatic view of names:
The Stronger View: 
All there is to semantic content is the lexically encoded content. Proper names are  
not associated with any lexically encoded content. As a consequence, proper names  
make no contribution to semantic content.
The Weaker View:
All there is to semantic content is the lexically encoded content, but crucially, not  
all lexically encoded content reaches into semantic content. 9 Although proper names 
can be associated with lexically encoded constraints, the latter are precisely of the sort  
that do not reach into semantic content and only intervene at a post-semantic stage, at  
which content is evaluated for a truth value. As a consequence, proper names, while  
lexically meaningful, make no contribution to semantic content.
9 As pointed out earlier, I take this to be an independently plausible assumption: e.g. the case of the  
lexically encoded information that the Spanish pronoun 'Usted' is a formal pronoun, or the difference  
between 'dad' and 'father', which I take to be semantically equivalent yet lexically different, prove the  
point forcefully. 
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While the weaker view results from combining the exclusive view of indexicals  
with some version of descriptivism regarding the lexical meaning of names, the idea  
on which the stronger view relies is that names are merely pragmatic devices, devoid  
of lexical meaning, and simply used by the speaker to help her interlocutors figure out  
to whom or what she is referring. For example, if I use the name 'Tareq', that will help  
you figure out that I am referring to Tareq – of course, only if you, too, are competent  
with this pragmatic device, that is, if, in the context at stake, we share the name 'Tareq'  
as a tag for the same person. Now, one might find it worrisome that language might  
contain elements that are merely pragmatic devices without any semantic import. But  
proper names would not be alone in that respect. Consider exclamatives: expressions 
like 'ouch', 'wow', etc. are also part of the language, yet we do not expect them to have  
any semantics. Similarly, adverbs like 'frankly', as in “Frankly, she is brilliant”, are  
often seen as devoid of semantic content. Of course, with proper names the situation  
might be more subtle. For one thing, names are used in the formation of sentences and  
often occupy the same positions as, for example, quantifier phrases and other  
semantically interpreted expressions. One might then worry whether stripping proper  
names of any semantics might be incompatible with compositional semantics. 
Without being able to address the question of what the syntax/semantic interface  
would look like on this view, let me stress that to the extent that the exclusive view of  
indexicals works, so does the pragmatic view of proper names: in either case, we have  
something in the syntax that then evaporates in the semantics. To be sure, there  
remains the question of what the semantic system will do when you give it as input a  
sentence that contains a name. One could clean up the sentence of all pragmatic  
devices before feeding it into the semantic system (which is, presumably, what one  
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would do with exclamatives like 'ouch'), or else, leave them in the input but teach the  
semantic system to ignore such inputs. Still, if we ask ourselves what a possible truth  
clause for a sentence containing a name, e.g. Tareq, might look like on this view, here  
is what immediately springs to mind:
[['Tareq is F']] (i, w, w*, t, t*) = True iff Tareq∈///[['F']] (w, t)
While this will look perfectly intelligible, I want to stress that the proposed truth  
clause is not innocent: it short-circuits the passage through the structure of  
interpretation. The truth clause roughly tells you, if you come across the name Tareq,  
to go and get directly that very individual, viz. Tareq himself, and check if he belongs 
to the interpretation of 'F' (relative to w and t) . Note that what this entails is that for 
every name in the object-language, there must be a corresponding name in the meta-
language; without this, it would be impossible to even write down the proposed truth  
clause.
A better way of extracting a truth clause for sentences involving names from the  
pragmatic view is, I believe, to take the proposal quite to the letter: proper names  
make no contribution to semantics. This gives us the following clause (for 'N' any  
proper name):
[['N is F']] (i, w, w*, t, t*) = True iff i∈///[['F']] (w, t)
In other words, the semantic content associated with 'N is F' is the very same as  
that associated with 'F' itself. And this, in turn, captures the idea that just as when I  
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say "He is a doctor", the constraint of being male might help you, though need not, in  
deciding to take Tareq (rather than, say, Aysha) to be the individual to whom I am  
ascribing the property of being a doctor, when I say "Tareq is a doctor", previous uses  
of the name 'Tareq' for a certain individual of which you are aware might help you,  
though need not, in deciding to take Tareq (rather than, say, Khaled) to be the one of  
whom I am speaking. In either case, reference to Tareq is achieved directly by me  
(qua speaker) and is supported by various contextual factors provided by the setting  
of our conversational exchange. The pronoun or the name are just one or another  
among the various devices on which I happen to rely in my act of referring, but they  
contribute nothing to semantic content. *
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